In terms of candidate quality characteristics, the electoral market has asymmetric information between candidates and voters, and asymmetric information creates an adverse selection issue in the electoral market. In an electoral market, poor-quality candidates will push good-quality candidates out of the electoral market if voters can not differentiate between good-quality and poor-quality candidates before voting: this is known as the electoral lemon issue. That is, candidates of good quality will not win the election against nationalist candidates of poor quality. Because of adverse selection, this electoral lemon issue can be eliminated or decreased by screening by voters or signalling by high-quality candidates. Voters can check the consistency of candidates, or candidates can give voters a signal. We try to analyse candidates’ signalling model to reassure voters that through campaign ads and its investments, they are of high quality. To justify the empirical model, we analyse a signalling model An inefficient product of higher spending. Campaign spending will improve the competitiveness of voters. The advertisement campaign for candidates serves to recognise candidates with high-quality features. In fact, campaign spending may be expended by candidates for the purpose of sending a signal to the personal quality of the candidate. However, quality signalling is often unproductive and therefore contributes to an inefficient outcome. The variable that represents the quality of the applicant is not clearly observable and thus, immeasurable. Attempts to quantify its impact would suffer from skewed assessments in the absence of a good measure of candidate efficiency. For this purpose, further research should concentrate on the production of an estimation technique to assess the quality of candidates.
Author (s) Details
Department of International Trade, Andong National University, 1375 Gyeongdong-ro, Andong-si, Gyeongsangbuk-do, 36729, South Korea.
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